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AGAINST CYBERANARCHY
Jack L. Goldsmith*
The Supreme Court's partial invalidation of the
Communications Decency Act on First
Amendment grounds raises the more fundamental
question of whether the state can regulate cyber-
space at all.' Several commentators, whom I shall
call "regulation skeptics," have argued that it can-
not. Some courts have also expressed skepticism.
The popular and technical press are full of similar
claims.
The regulation skeptics make both descriptive
and normative claims. On the descriptive side, they
claim that the application of geographically based
conceptions of legal regulation and choice of law to
a-geographical cyberspace activity either makes no
sense or leads to hopeless confusion. On the norma-
tive side, they argue that because cyberspace trans-
actions occur "simultaneously and equally" in all
national jurisdictions, regulation of the flow of this
information by any particular national jurisdiction
illegitimately produces significant negative spillover
effects in other jurisdictions. They also claim that
the architecture of cyberspace precludes notice of
governing law that is crucial to the law's legitimacy.
In contrast, they argue, cyberspace participants are
much better positioned than national regulators to
design comprehensive legal rules that would both
internalize the costs of cyberspace activity and give
proper notice to cyberspace participants. The regu-
lation skeptics conclude from these arguments that
national regulators should "defer to the self-regula-
tory efforts of Cyberspace participants."
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'Although the term "cyberspace" has a broader meaning, I shall use it
here loosely as a synonym for the Internet-the transnational net-
work of computer networks.
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This Article challenges the skeptics' arguments
and their conclusion. The skeptics make three basic
errors. First, they overstate the differences between
cyberspace transactions and other transnational
transactions. Both involve people in real space in
one territorial jurisdiction transacting with people in
real space in another territorial jurisdiction in a way
that sometimes causes real-world harms. In both
contexts, the state in which the harms are suffered
has a legitimate interest in regulating the activity
that produces the harms. Second, the skeptics do not
attend to the distinction between default laws and
mandatory laws. Their ultimate normative claim
that cyberspace should be self-regulated makes sense
with respect to default laws that, by definition, pri-
vate parties can modify to fit their needs. It makes
much less sense with respect to mandatory or regula-
tory laws that, for paternalistic reasons or in order to
protect third parties, place limits on private legal
ordering. Third, the skeptics underestimate the
potential of traditional legal tools and technology to
resolve the multijurisdictional regulatory problems
implicated by cyberspace. Cyberspace transactions
do not inherently warrant any more deference by
national regulators, and are not significantly less
resistant to the tools of conflict of laws, than other
transnational transactions.
Some caveats are in order up front. This Article
argues only that regulation of cyberspace is feasible
and legitimate from the perspective of jurisdiction
and choice of law. It does not argue that cyberspace
regulation is a good idea, and it does not take a posi-
tion on the merits of particular regulations beyond
their jurisdictional legitimacy. For example, it does
not examine whether particular national regulations
of the Internet promote democracy, or are efficient,
or are good or bad for humanity. Similarly, the
Article does not consider substantive limitations on
cyberspace regulation such as may be found in the
Bill of Rights or international human rights law.
Resolution of these substantive regulatory issues
turns in part on contested normative judgments and
difficult context-specific, cost-benefit analyses that
are far beyond this Article's scope. But resolution of
these issues also turns on how we understand the
jurisdictional confusions that arise when national
regulation, which has traditionally been understood
primarily in geographical terms, applies to a phe-
nomenon that appears to resist geographical orienta-
tion. This jurisdictional puzzle is the focus of this
Article.
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In addition, the Article does not deny that the
new communication technologies known as cyber-
space will lead to changes in governmental regula-
tion. Such changes are to be expected when the
speed of communication dramatically increases and
the cost of communication dramatically decreases.
The invention of the telegraph, the telephone, the
radio, the television, and the satellite, among many
other communications advances, all possessed these
characteristics. And they all gave rise to societal and
regulatory changes. So too will cyberspace. But the
skeptics claim much more than that cyberspace
necessitates changes in governmental regulation.
They claim that cyberspace is so different from other
communication media that it will, or should, resist
all governmental regulation. My aim here is to show
why this claim is flawed, and to explain in general
terms how traditional tools of jurisdiction and
choice of law apply to cyberspace transactions.
Section I of the Article summarizes the regulation
skeptics' claims. Section II provides a richer account
than the skeptics of the realities of real-space multi-
jurisdictional conflicts, and of the tools available to
manage such conflicts. Section III analyzes the skep-
tics' descriptive claim that national regulation of
cyberspace is infeasible. Section IV analyzes their
normative claim that such regulation is illegitimate.
I. THE REGULATION SKEPTICS' CLAIMS
People transacting in cyberspace do things that
would be regulated by state, national, or internation-
al law if they occurred in person or by telephone or
mail. They defame, invade privacy, harass, and com-
mit business torts. They make and breach contracts.
They distribute pornography and swap bombmaking
tips. They infringe trademarks, violate copyrights,
and steal data. They issue fraudulent securities and
restrict competition. And so on.
Are these and other cyberspace activities gov-
erned by the same laws that govern similar transna-
tional activities mediated in person, or by phone, or
by mail? If so, which jurisdiction's law governs? If
not, what governs instead?
The regulation skeptics' analysis of these ques-
tions makes two sets of assumptions. The first con-
cerns the nature of legal regulation of non-cyber-
space events. The skeptics tend to conceptualize a
nation's legal authority as extending to its territorial
borders and not beyond. This conception makes
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them skeptical about the legitimacy of one nation
regulating activities that take place in another. And
it leads them to believe that transnational disputes
must be resolved by choice-of-law rules that select a
unique governing law on the basis of where an event
occurs or where transacting parties are located. On
this view, tort liability is governed by the law of the
place where the tort occurred and the validity of a
contract is governed by the law of the place where
the contract was made. Such choice-of-law rules are
thought to promote rule-of-law values like uniformi-
ty (that is, every forum will apply the same law in a
given case), predictability, and certainty. And they
are supposed to give the parties to transnational
transactions reasonable notice of governing law.
The skeptics' second set of assumptions concerns
the architecture of cyberspace. They view cyber-
space as a unique "boundary-destroying" means of
communication. Internet protocol addresses do not
necessarily correlate with a physical location. As a
result, the skeptics assert, persons transacting in
cyberspace often do not, and cannot, know each
other's physical location. In addition, information
mediated by certain cyberspace services appears
"simultaneously and equally in all jursidictions"
around the world. A web page in Illinois can be
accessed from and thus appear in any geographical
jurisdiction that is plugged in to the World Wide
Web. When I participate in an online discussion
group, my messages can appear simultaneously in
every geographical jurisdiction where persons partic-
ipate in the group. In neither case can I control, or
even know about, the geographical flow of the infor-
mation that I upload or transmit.
It is against this background that the skeptics
make their descriptive and normative claims.
Descriptively, they claim that cyberspace is a border-
less medium that resists regulation conceived in geo-
graphical terms. One reason is that information
transmitted via cyberspace can easily flow across
national borders without detection. Another reason
is that it is senseless to apply geographically config-
ured choice-of-law rules to a-geographical cyber-
space activities. A third reason is that regulation of
the local effects of cyberspace information flows per-
mits all nations simultaneously to regulate all web-
based transactions. The result is multiple and
inconsistent regulation of the same activity. A final
reason is that the architecture of cyberspace enables
its users to route around or otherwise evade territori-
al regulation.
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The skeptics' normative arguments build on these
assumptions. Their essential normative claim is that
it is illegitimate for any particular nation to regulate
the local effects of multijurisdictional cyberspace
activity. This is so for three reasons. First, such regu-
lation will often apply to acts abroad, and will thus
be impermissibly extraterritorial. Second, because
cyberspace information flows appear in every juris-
diction simultaneously, unilateral regulation of these
flows will illegitimately affect the regulatory efforts
of other nations and the cyberspace activities of par-
ties in other jurisdictions. Third is the problem of
notice. The skeptics argue that because a person
transacting in cyberspace does not know when or
whether her activity produces effects in a particular
jurisdiction, she lacks notice about governing law
and therefore cannot conform her behavior to it.
They claim that under these conditions, it is unfair
to apply law to her cyberspace activities. The skep-
tics believe that all three of these problems can be
avoided by cyberspace self-regulation.
To make these claims more concrete, consider the
predicament of one of the scores of companies that
offer, sell, and deliver products on the World Wide
Web. Assume that the web page of a fictional
Seattle-based company, Digitalbook.com, offers digi-
tal books for sale and delivery over the Web. One
book it offers for sale is Lady Chatterley's Lover. This
offer extends to, and can be accepted by, computer
users in every country with access to the Web.
Assume that in Singapore the sale and distribution
of pornography is criminal, and that Singapore
deems Lady Chatterley's Lover to be pornographic.
Assume further that Digitalbook.com's terms of sale
contain a term that violates English consumer pro-
tection laws, and that the publication of
Digitalbook.com's Lady Chatterley's Lover in England
would infringe upon the rights of the novel's English
copyright owner. Digitalbook.com sells and sends
copies of Lady Chatterley's Lover to two people whose
addresses (say, anonymous@aol.com and anony-
mous@msn.com) do not reveal their physical loca-
tion but who, unbeknownst to Digitalbook.com, live
and receive the book in Singapore and London,
respectively.
The skeptics claim that it is difficult for courts in
Singapore or England to regulate disputes involving
these transactions in accordance with geographical
choice-of-law rules. In addition, they argue that
English and Singaporean regulations will expose
Digitalbook.com to potentially inconsistent obliga-
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tions. Finally, the skeptics claim that
Digitalbook.com can easily evade the Singaporean
and English regulations by sending unstoppable digi-
tal information into these countries from a locale
beyond their enforcement jurisdiction.
On the normative side, the skeptics are concerned
that the application of English and Singaporean law
to regulate Digitalbook.com's transactions consti-
tutes an impermissible extraterritorial regulation of a
U.S. corporation. Because Digitalbook.com might
bow to the English and Singaporean regulations, and
because the company cannot limit its cyberspace
information flows by geography, the English and
Singaporean regulations might cause it to withdraw
Lady Chatterley's Lover everywhere or to raise its
price. The English and Singaporean regulations
would thus affect Digitalbook.com's behavior in the
United States and adversely affect the purchasing
opportunities of parties in other countries. The skep-
tics believe these negative spillover effects of the
national regulations are illegitimate. They also think
it is unfair for England and Singapore to apply their
laws in this situation because Digitalbook.com had
no way of knowing that it sold and delivered a book
to consumers in these 'Countries.
11. "REAL-SPACE" JURISDICTIONAL
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
The skeptics are in the grip of a nineteenth century
territorialist conception of how "real space" is regu-
lated and how "real-space" conflicts of law are
resolved. This conception was repudiated in the
middle of this century. The skeptics' first mistake,
therefore, is to measure the feasibility and legitimacy
of national regulation of cyberspace against a repudi-
ated yardstick. This Section offers a more accurate
picture of real-space jurisdictional conflict manage-
ment as a prelude to analysis of the skeptics' claims.
Three factors led to the overthrow of the tradi-
tional approach to choice of law. The first was sig-
nificant changes in the world. Changes in trans-
portation, communication, and in the scope of cor-
porate activity led to an unprecedented increase in
multijurisdictional activity. These changes put pres-
sure on the rigid territorialist conception, which pur-
ported to identify a single legitimate governing law
for transborder activity based on discrete territorial
contacts. So too did the rise of the regulatory state,
which led to more caustic public policy differences
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among jurisdictions, and which pressured the inter-
ested forum to apply local regulations whenever pos-
sible.
A second factor, legal realism, contributed to the
demise of hermetic territorialism. All conflict-of-
laws problems by definition have connections to two
or more territorial jurisdictions. The legal realists
showed that nothing in the logic of territorialism
justified legal regulation by any one of these territo-
ries rather than another. They also argued that a
forum's decision to apply foreign law was always
determined by local domestic policies. This estab-
lished the theoretical foundation for the lex fori ori-
entation that has dominated choice of law ever
since.
A third factor, legal positivism, exacerbated the
problem of finding a unique governing law in trans-
actional cases. Courts avoided many choice-of-law
problems in such cases by applying universal custom-
ary laws tied to no particular sovereign authority,
such as the law merchant, the law maritime, and the
law of nations. But positivism's insistence on a sov-
ereign source for every rule of decision undermined
judicial reliance on these laws. It also contributed to
the waning of universal choice-of-law rules that
courts applied in circumstances in which transna-
tional customary laws did not govern. In the United
States, for example, the general uniformity of
choice-of-law approaches that characterized the
nineteenth century gave way in the twentieth cen-
tury to a plethora of choice-of-law regimes. As dif-
ferent jurisdictions adopted different choice-of-law
regimes, the goal of a single governing law for tran-
sjurisdictional transactions was further frustrated.
These factors did not completely undermine tradi-
tional views about territorial regulation. But they did
lead to an expansion of the permissible bases for ter-
ritorial jurisdiction. Today, the Constitution permits
a state to apply its law if it has a "significant contact
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state
interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbi-
trary nor fundamentally unfair." In practice, this
standard is notoriously easy to satisfy. It prohibits
the application of local law only when the forum
state has no interest in the case because the sub-
stance of the lawsuit has no relationship to the state.
Customary international law limits on a nation's
regulation of extraterritorial events are less clear
because there are few international decisions on
point, and because state practice does not reveal a
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settled custom. Nonetheless, it seems clear that cus-
tomary international law, like the United States
Constitution, permits a nation to apply its law to
extraterritorial behavior with substantial local
effects. In addition, both the Constitution and
international law permit a nation or state to regulate
the extraterritorial conduct of a citizen or domicil-
iary. In short, in modern times a transaction can
legitimately be regulated by the jurisdiction where
the transaction occurs, the jurisdictions where sig-
nificant effects of the transaction are felt, and the
jurisdictions where the parties burdened by the regu-
lation are from.
This expansion of the permissible bases for the
application of local law has revolutionized conflict
of laws in the second half of this century. Any num-
ber of choice-of-law regimes are now consistent with
constitutional and international law. The earlier
belief in a unique governing law for all transnational
activities has given way to the view that more than
one jurisdiction can legitimately apply its law to the
same transnational activity. The uniformity
promised by the traditional approach has thus been
replaced by the reality of overlapping jurisdictional
authority. This means that the application of one
jurisdiction's law often comes at the expense of the
nonapplication of the conflicting laws of other inter-
ested jurisdictions. Because choice-of-law rules often
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and because a
forum applies its own choice-of-law rules, the choice
of forum is now often critical to the selection of gov-
erning law. In this milieu, ex ante notice of a specif-
ic governing law is no longer a realistic goal in many
transnational situations. Not surprisingly, the
Constitution and international law impose very
weak notice requirements on the application of local
law to extraterritorial activity.
This modern world of jurisdictional conflict poses
obvious difficulties for participants in transnational
transactions. To understand these problems and
their resolution, it is important to distinguish
between default laws and mandatory laws. For pre-
sent purposes, a default law can be understood as one
that presumptively governs a particular relationship
or transaction, but that can be modified or circum-
vented by the parties in the relationship or transac-
tion. The default laws of different countries can cre-
ate a conflict of laws. For example, the estate of a
U.S. national who dies intestate in England, his
domicile, could potentially be subject to the succes-
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sion rules of either country. Similarly, a contract
made in one country for delivery of products in
another could be subject to the remedies regime of
either country.
Parties in such transnational relationships can
alleviate choice-of-law uncertainty with respect to
default rules by contracting for specific terms, by
selecting a governing law, or both. Most contractual
choice-of-law clauses govern the contracts within
which they are embedded. But the scope of this pri-
vate legal control is not limited to traditional con-
tractual issues. In many circumstances, parties can
agree to a governing law for torts and related actions
that arise from their contractual relations. They can
also specify the governing law for matters ranging
from intellectual property to trusts and estates to
internal corporate affairs.
The possibilities for private legal ordering are not
limitless. Every nation has mandatory laws that gov-
ern particular transactions or relationships regardless
of the wishes of the parties. The primary justifica-
tions for such laws are paternalism and protection of
third parties. Mandatory laws range from limits on
contractual capacity to criminal law to securities and
antitrust law. Like default laws, they differ in con-
tent and scope from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Unlike conflicts of default laws, conflicts of manda-
tory laws cannot be resolved easily by private con-
tract. They can, in theory, be resolved by public
contract-international agreements that embrace
uniform international rules or uniform choice-of-
law rules. Such solutions are increasingly prominent
but still relatively rare. Moreover, these attempts at
international uniformity are often limited to default
rules, and are littered with mandatory law excep-
tions.
This discussion shows that conflicts of law can
arise when parties to a transnational transaction do
not specify the governing default law, or when the
transaction implicates a mandatory law that con-
flicts with the otherwise applicable law. Absent a
governing international law, transnational activity
in these contexts will usually be governed by the law
of a single jurisdiction. And absent international
choice-of-law rules, the forum's choice-of-law rules
will determine the governing law. In regulatory con-
texts, the forum will invariably apply local law. But
regardless of which substantive law the forum
applies, the application of that law will frequently
create spillover effects on activities in other coun-
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tries and on the ability of other interested nations to
apply their own law. In our increasingly integrated
world, these spillover effects are likely to extend to
many countries.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California.
The Court held that the concerted refusal by
London reinsurers to sell certain types of reinsurance
to insurers in the United States violated the
Sherman Act. The reinsurers' acts in England were
legal under English law. But the Court determined
that the reinsurers were nonetheless subject to U.S.
regulation because their actions "produced substan-
tial effect[s]" in the United States. U.S. law thus
regulated the activities of English companies in
England at the expense of the nonapplication of
English law. Similarly, had an English court applied
English law to adjudge the reinsurers' acts to be
legal, it would have produced spillover effects on
consumers in the United States, and would have
come at the expense of the nonapplication of U.S.
law. No matter which law governed the reinsurers'
acts, the application of that law would have pro-
duced spillover effects on the English reinsurers'
activities in other jurisdictions, and on the activities
of persons in other jurisdictions adversely affected by
the reinsurers' acts.
A similar phenomenon occurs in many domestic
and international conflicts contexts. For example,
the European Commission recently imposed strict
conditions on a merger (already approved by the
Federal Trade Commission) between two American
companies with no manufacturing facilities in
Europe. Minnesota applied its pro-plaintiff stacking
rules for automobile insurance coverage to an acci-
dent in Wisconsin among Wisconsin residents. A
United States federal grand jury ordered the local
branch of a foreign bank, a nonparty, to disclose
bank records in the Bahamas in possible violation of
Bahamian law. California applied its workmen's
compensation law to benefit an employee of a
California corporation who suffered a tort while
working in Alaska-even though Alaska purported
to make its worker's compensation scheme exclu-
sive, and even though the employment contract
specified that Alaska law governed. New York
applied its tort law to a car accident in Canada.
California taxed a British corporation based on the
California portion of its world profits.
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In these situations and countless others, one juris-
diction regulates extraterritorial conduct in a way
that invariably affects individual behavior and regu-
latory efforts in other jurisdictions. These spillover
effects constitute the central problem of modern
conflict of laws. The problem is pervasive. It is also
inevitable, because the price of eliminating these
spillovers-abolishing national or subnational law-
making entities, or eliminating transnational activi-
ty-is prohibitively high. Most of the dizzying array
of modern choice-of-law methodologies are devoted
to minimizing these spillovers while at the same
time preserving the sovereign prerogative to regulate
effects within national borders. International har-
monization efforts seek to achieve similar aims, often
at the expense of national prerogatives.
There is widespread debate about which
approach, or combination of approaches, is prefer-
able. Resolution of this debate is less important for
present purposes than two uncontested assumptions
that underlie it. The first assumption is that in the
absence of consensual international solutions, pre-
vailing concepts of territorial sovereignty permit a
nation to regulate the local effects of extraterritorial
conduct even if this regulation produces spillover
effects in other jurisdictions. The second assumption
is that such spillover effects are a commonplace con-
sequence of the unilateral application of any particu-
lar law to transnational activity in our increasingly
interconnected world. It is against this background
that the skeptics' descriptive and normative claims
must be assessed.
III. IS CYBERSPACE REGULATION FEASIBLE?
This Section argues that the skeptics' claims about
the infeasibility of national regulation of cyberspace
rest on an underappreciation of the realities of mod-
ern conflict of laws, and of the legal and technologi-
cal tools available to resolve multijurisdictional
cyberspace conflicts. From the perspective of juris-
diction and choice of law, regulation of cyberspace
transactions is no less feasible than regulation of
other transnational transactions.
A. Default Laws and Private Ordering in Cyberspace
Cyberspace transactions that implicate default
laws, like other transnational transactions that
implicate such laws, are subject to private legal
ordering. The architecture of cyberspace facilitates
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this private ordering and thus enables cyberspace
participants to avoid many transnational conflicts of
law.
At the most basic level, private ordering is facili-
tated by the technical standards that define and
limit cyberspace. To participate in the Internet
function known as the World Wide Web, users must
consent to the TCP/IP standards that define the
Internet as well as to the HTML standards that
more particularly define the Web. Similarly, sending
e-mail over the Internet requires the sender to use
TCP/IP standards and particular e-mail protocols.
One's experience of cyberspace is further defined
and limited by the more particular communication
standards embedded in software. For example, with-
in the range of what TCP/IP and HTML permit, an
individual's communication via the World Wide
Web will be shaped and limited by (among many
other things) her choice of browsers and search
engines. These and countless other technical stan-
dard choices order behavior in cyberspace. In this
sense, access to different cyberspace networks and
communities is always conditioned on the accessors'
consent to the array of technical standards that
define these networks and communities.
Technical standards cannot comprehensively
specify acceptable behavior in cyberspace. Within
the range of what these standards permit, informa-
tion flows might violate network norms or territorial
laws. Many network norms are promulgated and
enforced informally. A more formal method to
establish private legal orders in cyberspace is to con-
dition access to particular networks on consent to a
particular legal regime.
This regime could take several forms. It could be a
local, national, or international law. When you buy
a Dell computer through the company's web page
from anywhere in the world, you agree that "[any
claim relating to, and the use of, this Site and the
materials contained herein is governed by the laws
of the state of Texas." Alternatively, the chosen law
could be a free-standing model law attached to no
particular sovereign but available to be incorporated
by contract. For example, parties to a commercial
transaction over the Internet could agree that their
transaction is governed by UNIDROIT Principles or
the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits. Or the governing law could be the contrac-
tual terms themselves. Waivers and exclusions oper-
ate as private law in this way. So too do chat rooms,
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discussion lists, and local area networks that condi-
tion participation on the user's consent to communi-
ty norms specified in a contract.
Cyberspace architecture can also help to establish
other aspects of a private legal order. Through con-
ditioned access, cyberspace users can consent to
have subsequent disputes resolved by courts, arbitra-
tors, systems operators, or even "virtual magistrates."
They can also establish private enforcement regimes.
Technical standards operate as an enforcer of sorts
by defining and limiting cyberspace activity. For
example, software filters can block or condition
access to certain information, and various technolo-
gies perform compliance monitoring functions. In
addition, the gatekeeper of each cyberspace commu-
nity can cut off entry for noncompliance with the
community rules, or punish a user for bad acts by
drawing on a bond (perhaps simply a credit card) put
up as a condition on the user's entry.
Many have proposed a structure for private legal
ordering of cyberspace along the lines just sketched.
There is nothing remarkable about this structure. It
differs little from the legal structure of other private
groups, such as churches, merchants, families, clubs,
and corporations, which have analogous consent-
based governing laws, dispute resolution mecha-
nisms, and private enforcement regimes. But just as
private ordering is often not a comprehensive solu-
tion to the regulation of "real-space" private groups,
it will not be a comprehensive solution to the regu-
lation of cyberspace either.
In part this is because it remains an open question
how to generate consent across cyberspace networks.
Conditioning access on consent to a governing legal
regime is relatively easy at the entry point of a cyber-
space network. In theory, it is just as easy to generate
such consent at the interface between networks. It is
commonplace to click on a hypertext link and be
greeted by a message that conditions further access
on presentation of an identification code, or credit
card number, or personal information such as age
and address. A similar demand for consent to a par-
ticular legal regime could be added as a condition for
access. However, this process might become confus-
ing; the technological and conceptual details of con-
senting to and coordinating different legal regimes as
one works one's way through dozens of cyberspace
networks remain to be worked out. In addition, the
generation of legal consent across networks will
impose time and other costs that are anathema to
many cyberspace users.
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An important additional difficulty is that many
cyberspace activities affect non-cyberspace partici-
pants with whom ex ante consent to a private legal
regime will not be possible. Cyberspace is not, as the
skeptics often assume, a self-enclosed regime. A
communication in cyberspace often has conse-
quences for persons outside the computer network in
which the communication took place. For example:
a book uploaded on the Net can violate an author's
copyright; a chat room participant can defame some-
one outside the chat room; terrorists can promulgate
bomb making or kidnapping tips; merchants can
conspire to fix prices by e-mail; a corporation can
issue a fraudulent security; a pornographer can sell
kiddie porn; Internet gambling can decrease in-state
gambling revenues and cause family strife; and so on.
In these and many other ways, communications via
cyberspace produce harmful, real-world effects on
those who have not consented to the private order-
ing of the cyberspace community.
Finally, even if the hurdles to consent can be sur-
mounted, consent-based legal orders are limited by a
variety of national mandatory law restrictions.
These mandatory laws define who may consent to
these private regimes. For example, they prevent
persons of certain ages from entering into certain
types of contracts. They also limit the form and
scope of such consent. The consideration require-
ment and limitations on liquidated damages clauses
fall into this category, as do requirements that the
law chosen by the parties have a reasonable relation-
ship to the subject matter of the contract. Some
mandatory laws also limit the internal and external
activities of the group's activities. Criminal law, for
example, falls in this category.
Private legal ordering thus has the potential to
resolve many, but not all, of the challenges posed by
multijurisdictional cyberspace activity. Cyberspace
activities for which ex ante consent to a governing
legal regime is either infeasible or unenforceable are
not amenable to private ordering. Such activities
remain subject to the skeptics' concerns about multi-
ple or extraterritorial national regulation.
B. The Limits of Enforcement Jurisdiction
The skeptics' concerns are further attenuated,
however, by limitations on every nation's ability to
enforce its laws. A nation can purport to regulate
activity that takes place anywhere. But the effective
scope of a nation's law depends on the nation's abili-
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ty to enforce it. And in general a nation can only
enforce its laws against: (i) persons with a presence
or assets in the nation's territory; (ii) persons over
whom the nation can obtain personal jurisdiction
and enforce a default judgment against abroad; or
(iii) persons whom the nation can successfully extra-
dite.
A defendant's physical presence or assets within
the territory remains the primary basis for a nation
or state to enforce its laws. The large majority of per-
sons who transact in cyberspace have no presence or
assets in the jurisdictions that wish to regulate their
information flows in cyberspace. Such regulations
are thus likely to apply primarily to Internet service
providers and Internet users with a physical presence
in the regulating jurisdiction. Cyberspace users in
other territorial jurisdictions will indirectly feel the
effect of the regulations to the extent that they are
dependent on service or content providers with a
presence in the regulating jurisdiction. But for
almost all users, there will be no threat of extraterri-
torial legal liability because of a lack of presence in
the regulating jurisdictions.
A nation or state can also enforce its laws over an
entity with no local presence or assets if it can
obtain personal jurisdiction over the entity and
enforce a local default judgment against that entity
abroad. The domestic interstate context presents a
much greater threat in this regard than does the
international context. This is because the Full Faith
and Credit Clause requires a state to enforce the
default judgment of a sister state that had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. This threat is atten-
uated, however, by constitutional limits on a state's
assertion of personal jurisdiction. The Due Process
Clauses prohibit a state from asserting personal juris-
diction over an entity with no local presence unless
the entity has purposefully directed its activities to
the forum state and the assertion of jurisdiction is
reasonable.
Application of this standard to cyberspace activi-
ties presents special difficulties. Under standard
assumptions about cyberspace architecture, persons
can upload or transmit information knowing that it
could reach any and all jurisdictions, but not know-
ing which particular jurisdiction it might reach. Can
every state where these transmissions appear assert
specific personal jurisdiction over the agent of the
information under the purposeful availment and rea-
sonableness tests?
15
Full consideration of this issue is far beyond this
Article's scope. I simply wish to point out why there
is relatively little reason at present, and even less
reason in the near future, to believe that the mere
introduction of information into cyberspace will by
itself suffice for personal jurisdiction over the agent
of the transmission in every state where the informa-
tion appears. Most courts have required something
more than mere placement of information on a web
page in one state as a basis for personal jurisdiction
in another state where the web page is accessed. For
a variety of reasons, these decisions have limited
specific personal jurisdiction to cases in which there
are independent indicia that the out-of-state defen-
dant knowingly and purposefully directed the effects
of out-of-state conduct to a particular state where
the acts were deemed illegal.
Given the skeptics' assumptions about cyberspace
architecture, this conclusion appears appropriate. It
seems unfair to expose a content provider to person-
al jurisdiction in all fifty states for the mere act of
uploading information on a computer if she cannot
take affordable precautions to avoid simultaneous
multi-jurisdictional effects. But we shall see below
that the skeptics' architectual assumptions are inac-
curate. It is already possible for content providers to
take measures to achieve significant control over
information flows. And filtering and identification
technology promise greater control at less cost. In
cyberspace as in real space, the ultimate meaning of
"purposeful availment" and "reasonableness" will
depend on the cost and feasibility of information
flow control. As such control becomes more feasible
and less costly, personal jurisdiction over cyberspace
activities will become functionally identical to per-
sonal jurisdiction over real-space activities.
This detour into the technicalities of personal
jurisdiction was necessitated by a worry about the
extraterritorial enforcement of local default judg-
ments against nonlocal cyberspace users within the
American federal system. Such concerns are less pro-
nounced in the international context. In contrast to
the domestic interstate context, customary interna-
tional law imposes few enforceable controls on a
country's assertion of personal jurisdiction, and there
are few treaties on the subject. However, also in
contrast to domestic law, there is no full faith and
credit obligation to enforce foreign judgments in the
international sphere. If one country exercises per-
sonal jurisdiction on an exorbitant basis, the result-
ing judgment is unlikely to be enforced in another
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country. In addition, local public policy exceptions
to the enforcement of foreign judgments are rela-
tively commonplace in the international sphere,
especially when the foreign judgment flies in the
face of the enforcing state's regulatory regime. For
these reasons, there is little concern that a foreign
default judgment will be enforceable against cyber-
space users who live outside the regulating jurisdic-
tion.
The final way that a nation can enforce its regula-
tions against persons outside its jurisdiction is by
seeking extradition. In the United States, extradi-
tion among the several states is regulated by Article
IV of the Constitution and the federal extradition
law. As a general matter, State A must accede to
the proper demand of State B for the surrender of a
fugitive who committed an act in State B that State
B considers a crime. Nonetheless, a person who in
State A transmits information flows that appear in
and constitute a crime in State B will not likely be
subject to extradition to State B under these provi-
sions. This is because the extradition obligation only
extends to fugitives who have fled State B, and these
terms have long been limited to persons who were
physically present in the demanding state at the
time of the crime's commission. A different, but
equally forceful, limitation applies to international
extradition. International extradition is governed
largely by treaty. A pervasive feature of modern
extradition treaties is the principle of double crimi-
nality. This principle requires that the charged
offense be criminal in both the requesting and the
requested jurisdictions. This principle, and its ani-
mating rationale, make it unlikely that there will be
international cooperation in the enforcement of
exorbitant unilateral criminal regulations of cyber-
space events.
This review of transnational enforcement jurisdic-
tion makes clear that the skeptics exaggerate the
threat of multiple regulation of cyberspace informa-
tion flows. This threat must be measured by a regula-
tion's enforceable scope, not by its putative scope.
And the enforceable scope is relatively narrow. It
extends only to individual users or system operators
with presence or assets in the enforcement jurisdic-
tion, or (in the U.S.) to entities that take extra steps
to target cyberspace information flows to states
where such information flows are illegal. Such regu-
latory exposure is a significant concern for cyber-
space participants. But it is precisely how regulatory
exposure operates in "real space." And it is far less
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significant than the skeptics' hyperbolic claim that
all users of the Web will be simultaneously subject to
all national regulations.
Even with these limitations, the skeptics worry
that an individual cyberspace content provider in
one jurisdiction faces potential liability in another
jurisdiction when she places information on the
Internet. This potential liability can become an
unforeseen reality when the provider travels to the
regulating jurisdiction, or moves assets there. Such
potential liability in turn affects the providers' activ-
ities at home and thus can be viewed as a weak form
of extraterritorial regulation. This form of regulation
is a theoretical possibility, but it should not be exag-
gerated. No nation has as yet imposed liability on a
content provider for unforeseen effects in an
unknown jurisdiction. The threat of such liability
will lessen as content providers continue to gain
means to control information flows. It is also con-
ceivable that weak normative limitations might exist
or develop to prevent a jurisdiction from regulating
local effects that were truly unforeseeable or uncon-
trollable. The point for now is that even in the
absence of such limits, this potential threat of liabili-
ty is relatively insignificant and does not come close
to the skeptics' broad descriptive claims about mas-
sive multiple regulation of individual users.
C. Indirect Regulation of Extraterritorial Activity
Indeed, if the limits on enforcement jurisdiction
support any of the skeptics' descriptive claims, it is
their somewhat different claim that because of the
potential for regulation evasion, cyberspace transac-
tions are beyond the regulatory powers of territorial
governments. Cyberspace content providers can, at
some cost, shift the source of their information flows
to jurisdictions beyond the enforceable scope of
national regulation and thus continue information
transmissions into the regulating jurisdiction. For
example, they can relocate in geographical space, or
employ telnet or anonymous remailers to make the
geographical source of their content difficult to dis-
cern. These and related regulatory evasion tech-
niques can make it difficult for a nation to regulate
the extraterritorial supply side of harmful cyberspace
activity.
Regulation evasion of this sort is not limited to
cyberspace. For example, corporations reincorporate
to avoid mandatory laws and criminals launder
money offshore. Closer to point, offshore regulation
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evasion has been a prominent characteristic of other
communication media. For example, Radio-Free
Europe broadcast from western Europe into the for-
mer Soviet Union but lacked a regulatable presence
there. Similarly, television signals are sometimes
broadcast from abroad by an entity with no local
presence. The extraterritorial source of these and
many other non-cyberspace activities is beyond the
enforceable scope of local regulation. But this does
not mean that local regulation is inefficacious. In
cyberspace as in real space, offshore regulation eva-
sion does not prevent a nation from regulating the
extraterritorial activity.
This is so because a nation can regulate people
and equipment in its territory to control the local
effects of the extraterritorial activity. Such indirect
regulation is how nations have, with varying degrees
of success, regulated local harms caused by other
communications media with offshore sources and no
local presence. And it is how nations have begun to
regulate local harms caused by offshore Internet con-
tent providers. For example, nations penalize in-
state end users who obtain and use illegal content or
who otherwise participate in an illegal cyberspace
transaction. They also regulate the local means
through which foreign content is transmitted. For
example, they impose screening obligations on in-
state Internet service providers and other entities
that supply or transmit information. Or they regu-
late in-state hardware and software through which
such transmissions are received. Or they regulate
the local financial intermediaries that make com-
mercial transactions on the Internet possible.
These and related regulations of domestic persons
and property make it more costly, and thus more dif-
ficult, for in-state users to obtain content from, or
transact with, regulation evaders abroad. In this
fashion a nation can indirectly regulate the extrater-
ritorial supply of prohibited content even though
the source of the content is beyond its enforcement
jurisdiction and even though it cannot easily stop
transmission at the border. These various forms of
indirect regulation will not be perfect in the sense of
eliminating regulation evasion. But few regulations
are perfect in this sense, and regulation need not be
perfect in this sense to be effective. The question is
always whether the regulation will heighten the
costs of the activity sufficiently to achieve its accept-
able control from whatever normative perspective is
appropriate.
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In the cyberspace regulation context, the answer
to this question depends on empirical and techno-
logical issues that are unresolved and that will vary
from context to context. The prodigious criticism of
and lobbying efforts against proposed regulation of
(among other things) digital goods, Internet gam-
bling, and encryption technology suggest that gov-
ernments can raise the costs of many cyberspace
transactions to a significant degree. And of course
unilateral national regulation is one of many regula-
tion strategies at a nation's disposal. The point for
now is simply that offshore regulation evasion does
not, as the skeptics think, undermine a nation's abil-
ity to regulate cyberspace transactions. Although a
nation will sometimes have difficulty in imposing
liability on extraterritorial content providers, it can
still significantly regulate the local effects of these
providers' activities through laws aimed at local per-
sons and entities.
D. Filtering
We have seen that the skeptics' worries about
multiple or extraterritorial regulation of cyberspace
activity do not extend to matters for which it is fea-
sible and legal for cyberspace communities to estab-
lish private legal regimes, or to matters beyond a
nation's enforcement jurisdiction.
But the possibility of extraterritorial and multiple
regulations remains. Consider the Bavarian Justice
Ministry's threat in December of 1995 to prosecute
CompuServe for carrying online discussion groups
containing material that violated German anti-
pornography laws. CompuServe responded by
blocking access to these discussion groups in
Germany. Because of the state of then-available
technology, this action had the effect of blocking
access to these discussion groups for all CompuServe
users worldwide. This is precisely what the skeptics
fear- from unilateral regulation of cyberspace.
Germany enforced a mandatory law against an inter-
national access provider with a presence (office,
staff, servers, etc.) in Germany. Faced.with multiple
regulatory regimes in the many places where it did
business, CompuServe bowed to the most restrictive.
The consequence was massive extraterritorial regula-
tion, for the German regulation interrupted the flow
and availability of the discussion groups for
CompuServe clients everywhere in the world.
The skeptics frequently recount this story to show
how unilateral national regulation of cyberspace can
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have multijurisdictional consequences. But the rest
of the story suggests a somewhat different lesson.
After closing down transmission of the offending
discussions, CompuServe offered its German users
software that enabled them to block access to the
offending discussion groups. The company then
began to search for a more centralized way to filter
the illegal newsgroups in Germany alone. German
prosecutors subsequently indicted a CompuServe
executive, alleging that the company failed to imple-
ment such national-level filtering technology to pre-
vent dissemination of other illegal information in
Germany. At about the same time, the German par-
liament enacted a law clarifying that cyberspace
access providers are liable "if they are aware of the
content" and fail to use "technically possible and
reasonable" means to block it.
The subsequent events of the CompuServe con-
troversy, like the response to the Supreme Court's
invalidation of the Communications Decency Act
in Reno, make clear the growing importance of
information discrimination technology to the cyber-
space regulation debate. Many jurisdictional chal-
lenges presented by cyberspace result from the pur-
ported inability of content providers to prevent
information flows from appearing simultaneously in
every jurisdiction. Thus far I have assumed, with the
skeptics, that this is a necessary (and accurate) fea-
ture of cyberspace architecture. But it is not.
Cyberspace information can only appear in a geo-
graphical jurisdiction by virtue of hardware and soft-
ware physically present in the jurisdiction. Available
technology already permits governments and private
entities to regulate the design and function of hard-
ware and software to facilitate discrimination of
cyberspace information flows along a variety of
dimensions, including geography, network, and con-
tent. This technology is relatively new and still rela-
tively crude, but it is growing very quickly in both
sophistication and effectiveness. This technology
facilitates discrimination and control of information
flows at any of several junctures along the cyber-
space information stream.
At the most basic level, the content provider can
take steps to control the flow of the information.
This happens, for example, whenever a web page
operator conditions access to the page on the users'
presentation of information. Consider the many pre-
cautions taken by adult web pages. Some pages sim-
ply warn minors or persons from certain geographi-
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cal locations not to view or enter, and disclaim legal
liability if they do. Others condition access on proof
of age or on membership in one of dozens of private
age-verification services. Others require potential
end-users to send by fax or telephone information
specifying age and geographical location. Still oth-
ers label or rate their pages in order to accommodate
end-use filtering software, as described below.
Finally, digital identification technology developed
for Internet commerce provides a way to authenti-
cate the identity of a party in a cyberspace transac-
tion. Although digital identification is usually used
to verify who someone is, it can also be used to veri-
fy other facts about cyberspace users, such as their
nationality, domicile, or permanent address.
At the other end of the distribution chain, end-
users can employ software filters to block out or dis-
criminate among information flows. Parental con-
trol software is the most prominent example of an
end-user filter, but many businesses and other local
area networks also employ these technologies.
Content filters also can be imposed at junctures
along the cyberspace information stream between
content providers and end-users. They can be
imposed, for example, at the network level or at the
level of the Internet service provider. They can also
assist governments in filtering information at the
national level. A government can choose to have
no Internet links whatsoever and to regulate tele-
phone and other communication lines to access
providers in other countries. China, Singapore, and
the United Arab Emirates have taken the somewhat
less severe steps of (i) regulating access to the Net
through centralized filtered servers, and (ii) requir-
ing filters for in-state Internet service providers and
end-users. We have seen that Germany has chosen
to hold liable Internet access providers who have
knowledge of illegal content and fail to use "techni-
cally possible and reasonable" means to filter it. The
Federal Communications Commission recently
required V-chip blocking technology to be placed in
computers capable of receiving video broadcasting,
and pending anti-spam legislation would impose
identification requirements on commercial e-mail
senders and filtering requirements on Internet ser-
vice providers. There are numerous other possibili-
ties.
Although technological predictions are precari-
ous, it seems likely that the techniques and tech-
nologies for controlling cyberspace information
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flows will continue to develop in scope and sophisti-
cation, and will play an important role in resolving
the jurisdictional quandaries presented by the "bor-
derless" medium. Information is not particularly use-
ful unless people can organize, select, and block it.
This is one reason why information filtering is an
essential component of all communications media.
Filtering is especially important for cyberspace,
where the costs of information production and dis-
semination are extremely low, and thus information
overload is a serious concern. Indeed, the explosive
growth of the World Wide Web is directly attribut-
able to the invention of identification and filtering
technologies that made it possible to organize and
select from the morass of available information.
An additional reason that techniques for control-
ling cyberspace information flows are likely to be at
least moderately successful is that so many partici-
pants in the cyberspace regulation debate-parents,
businesses, content suppliers, service providers, gov-
ernments, and even some anticensorship civil liber-
tarians -desire such control. As Resnick has point-
ed out, "meta-data systems . . . are going to be an
important part of the Web, because they enable
more sophisticated commerce . . . , communication,
indexing, and searching services." Many jurisdic-
tions have already mandated the use of filtering and
identification mechanisms. Even in the absence of
government mandates, content filtering and digital
identification technologies have flourished for com-
merical reasons and in response to the threat of reg-
ulation, and have become de facto standards in
many cyberspace contexts.
Many commentators are skeptical about these fil-
tering and identification technologies. They argue
that content filters invariably both over- and under-
filter; that identification technologies sometimes
misidentify; and that some hackers will access pro-
hibited information. These worries are to some
degree well-founded. What is not well-founded,
however, is the belief that imperfect regulation
means ineffective regulation. Real space is filled
with similarly imperfect filtering and identification
techniques: criminals crack safes and escape from
jail, fifteen year olds visit bars with fake IDs, secret
information is leaked to the press, and so on. In
cyberspace as in real space, imperfections in filtering
and identification regimes do not render the regimes
ineffective. Although the ultimate accuracy of
cyberspace filtering and identification technologies
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remains an open question, there is little doubt that
such technologies will contribute significantly to
cyberspace regulation by enabling governments,
content providers, end-users, and service providers
to raise significantly the cost of accessing certain
information. Indeed, this has already happened
throughout cyberspace, where content filtering, con-
ditioned access, and identification codes are perva-
sive.
The ability to control information flows alleviates
the many cyberspace regulation problems that are
premised on the assumption that information in
cyberspace appears simultaneously in every jurisdic-
tion. To see why, consider one set of differences
between a newspaper publisher and a cyberspace
content provider. It is relatively uncontroversial that
a newspaper publisher is liable for harms caused
wherever the newspaper is published or distributed.
This seems appropriate because, among other rea-
sons, we think the publisher can control the geo-
graphical locus of publication and distribution.
Requiring such control imposes modest costs on the
publisher; she must, for example, keep abreast of reg-
ulatory developments in different jurisdictions and
take steps to exclude publication and distribution in
places where she wants to avoid liability.
Now consider the cyberspace content provider.
Many have an intuition that such content providers
should not be liable for harms caused wherever the
content appears. The primary basis for this intuition
is that the content provider cannot control the geo-
graphical and network distribution of his informa-
tion flows. But this latter point is groundless.
Content providers already have several means to
control information flows. As the cost of such con-
trol continues to drop, and the accuracy and ease of
this control increases, cyberspace content providers
will come to occupy the same position as the news-
paper publisher. It will thus be appropriate in cyber-
space, as in real space, for the law to impose small
costs on both types of publisher to ensure that con-
tent does not appear in jurisdictions and networks
where it is illegal.
E. International Harmonization
Private legal ordering, the limitations on enforce-
ment jurisdiction, indirect regulation, and effective
information flow control, taken together, go a long
way toward redressing the skeptics' descriptive
claims about the infeasibility of cyberspace regula-
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tion. These techniques will not resolve all conflict of
laws in cyberspace any more than they do in real
space. Nor will they definitively resolve the problem
of the relative ease by which information suppliers
can "relocate" into a safe haven outside of the regu-
lating jurisdiction, a problem that also has many
real-space analogies. When similar spillover and
evasion problems have occurred with respect to non-
cyberspace transactions, nations have responded
with a variety of international harmonization strate-
gies.
The same harmonization strategies are being used
today to address the challenges presented by cyber-
space transactions. A few examples will suffice.
Several recent treaties and related multinational
edicts have strengthened digital content owners'
right to control the distribution and presentation of
their property online. These harmonization efforts
grow out of an international copyright regime that is
over one hundred years old. The G8 economic pow-
ers have recently begun to coordinate regulatory
efforts concerning cyberspace-related crimes in five
areas: pedophilia and sexual exploitation; drug-traf-
ficking; money-laundering; electronic fraud; and
industrial and state espionage. These initiatives mir-
ror similar efforts to redress similar regulatory leak-
age problems in real-space contexts such as environ-
mental policy, banking and insurance supervision,
and antitrust regulation. Several international orga-
nizations have drafted model laws and guidelines to
facilitate Internet commerce and related digital cer-
tification issues. There are scores of other interna-
tional efforts in a variety of cyberspace-related con-
texts.
International harmonization is not always (or
even usually) the best response to the spillovers and
evasions that result from unilateral regulation. And
harmonization is often not easy to achieve.
However, the proliferation of international organiza-
tions, in combination with modern means of com-
munication and transportation, has helped to facili-
tate international harmonization. Harmonization is
especially likely in those contexts-like many
aspects of criminal law enforcement-where
nations' interests converge and the gains from coop-
eration are high. But nations sometimes lack the
incentive to participate in international regimes,
and there are often international and domestic polit-
ical economy obstacles to harmonization. It is too
early to tell how successful international efforts will
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be in addressing the challenges of cyberspace. It is
clear, however, that international harmonization
will play an important role in nations' overall cyber-
space-regulation strategy.
F. Residual Choice-of-Law Tools
The skeptics' implicit goal of eliminating all con-
flicts of laws that arise from cyberspace transactions
is unrealistic. Private legal ordering, the limits of
enforcement jurisdiction, indirect regulation of
extraterritorial activity, filtering and identification
technology, and international cooperation facilitate
and rationalize legal regulation of cyberspace. These
tools, however, will not eliminate all conflicts of
laws in cyberspace any more than they do in real
space. Transnational activity is too complex. As
mentioned above, the elimination of conflict of laws
would require the elimination of decentralized law-
making or of transnational activity. In this light,
the enormous increases in the pervasiveness and
complexity of conflict of laws in this century can be
viewed as an acceptable cost to a world that wishes
to expand transnational activity while retaining
decentralized lawmaking. As persistent conflicts
become prohibitively costly to private parties and
regulating nations, public or private international
coordination or technological innovation becomes
more attractive and thus more likely.
Short of these developments, transnational trans-
actions in cyberspace, like transnational transactions
mediated by telephone and mail, will continue to
give rise to disputes that present challenging choice-
of-law issues. For example: "Whose substantive legal
rules apply to a defamatory message that is written
by someone in Mexico, read by someone in Israel by
means of an Internet server located in the United
States, injuring the reputation of a Norwegian?"
Similarly, [wihich of the many plausibly applicable
bodies of copyright law do we consult to determine
whether a hyperlink on a World Wide Web page
located on a server in France and constructed by a
Filipino citizen, which points to a server in Brazil
that contains materials protected by German and
French (but not Brazilian) copyright law, which is
downloaded to a server in the United States and
reposted to a Usenet newsgroup, constitutes a reme-
diable infringement of copyright?
It would be silly to try to formulate a general theo-
ry of how such issues should be resolved. One lesson
of this century's many failures in top-down choice-
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of-law theorizing is that choice-of-law rules are most
effective when they are grounded in and sensitive to
the concrete details of particular legal contexts. This
does not mean that standards are better than rules in
this context. It simply means that in designing
choice-of-law rules or standards, it is better to begin
at the micro rather than macro level, and to exam-
ine recurrent fact patterns and implicated interests
in discrete legal contexts rather than devise a gener-
al context-transcendent theory of conflicts.
With these caveats in mind, I want to explain in
very general terms why the residual choice-of-law
problems implicated by cyberspace are not signifi-
cantly different from those that are non-cyberspace
conflicts. Cyberspace presents two related choice-of-
law problems. The first is the problem of complexity.
This is the problem of how to choose a single gov-
erning law for cyberspace activity that has multi-
jurisdictional contacts. The second problem con-
cerns situs. This is the problem of how to choose a
governing law when the locus of activity cannot eas-
ily be pinpointed in geographical space. Both prob-
lems raise similar concerns. The choice of any dis-
positive geographical contact or any particular law
in these cases will often seem arbitrary because sev-
eral jurisdictions have a legitimate claim to apply
their law. Whatever law is chosen, seemingly gen-
uine regulatory interests of the nations whose laws
are not applied may be impaired.
The problems of complexity and situs are genuine.
They are not, however, unique to cyberspace.
Identical problems arise all the time in real space. In
fact, they inhere in every true conflict of laws.
Consider the problem of complexity. The hypotheti-
cals concerning copyright infringements and multi-
state libels in cyberspace are no more complex than
the same issues in real space. They also are no more
complex or challenging than similar issues presented
by increasingly prevalent real-space events such as
airplane crashes, mass torts, multistate insurance
coverage, or multinational commercial transactions,
all of which form the bread and butter of modern
conflict of laws. Indeed, they are no more complex
than a simple products liability suit arising from a
two-car accident among residents of the same state,
which can implicate the laws of several states,
including the place of the accident, the states where
the car and tire manufacturers are headquartered,
the states where the car and tires were manufac-
tured, and the state where the car was purchased.
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Resolution of choice-of-law problems in these
contexts is challenging. But the skeptics overstate
the challenge. Not every geographical contact is of
equal significance. For example, in the copyright
hypothetical above, the laws of the source country
and the end-use countries have a much greater claim
to governing the copyright action than the laws of
the country of the person who built the server and
the country of the server whose hyperlink pointed to
the server that contained the infringing material.
The limits on enforcement jurisdiction may further
minimize the scope of the conflict. In addition,
even in extraordinarily complex cases where numer-
ous laws potentially apply, these laws will often
involve similar legal standards, thus limiting the
actual choice of law to two or perhaps three options.
Finally, these complex transactions need not be gov-
erned by a single law. Applying different laws to dif-
ferent aspects of a complex transaction is a perfectly
legitimate choice-of-law technique.
The application of a single law to complex multi-
jurisdictional conflicts will sometimes seem arbitrary
and will invariably produce spillover effects. But as
explained above, the arbitrariness of the chosen law,
and the spillovers produced by application of this
law, inhere in all conflict situations in which two or
more nations, on the basis of territorial or domicil-
iary contacts, have a legitimate claim to apply their
law. When in particular contexts the arbitrariness
and spillovers become too severe, a uniform interna-
tional solution remains possible. Short of such har-
monization, the choice-of-law issues implicated by
cyberspace transactions are no more complex than
the issues raised by functionally identical multijuris-
dictional transactions that occur in real space all the
time. .
Like the problem of complexity, the situs problem
is a pervasive and familiar feature of real-space juris-
dictional conflicts. A classic difficulty is the situs of
intangibles like a debt or a bank deposit. More gen-
erally, the situs problem arises whenever legally sig-
nificant activity touches on two or more states. For
example, when adultery committed in one state
alienates the affections of a spouse in another, the
situs of the tort is not self-evident. It depends on
what contact the forum's choice-of-law rule deems
dispositive. Similar locus difficulties arise when the
tort takes place over many states, such as when poi-
son is administered in one state, takes effect in
another, and kills in a third. The situs problem even
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arises when a bodily injury occurs in one state based
on negligence committed in another, for there is no
logical reason why the place of injury should be
viewed as the place of the tort any more than should
the place of negligence. In all of these situations,
the importance of any particular geographical con-
tact is never self-evident; it is a legal rather than a
factual consideration that is built into the forum's
choice-of-law rules. As the geographical contacts of
a transaction proliferate, the choice of any one con-
tact as dispositive runs the risk of appearing arbi-
trary. But again, this problem pervades real-space
conflicts of law and is not unique to cyberspace con-
flicts.
So the complexity and situs problems inhere to
some degree in all transnational conflicts, and are
exacerbated in real space and cyberspace alike as
jurisdictional contacts proliferate. No choice-of-law
rule will prove wholly satisfactory in these situations.
However, several factors diminish the skeptics' con-
cerns about the infeasibility of applying traditional
choice-of-law tools to cyberspace. For example, the
skeptics are wrong to the extent that they believe
that cyberspace transactions must be resolved on the
basis of geographical choice-of-law criteria that are
sometimes difficult to apply to cyberspace, such as
where events occur or where people are located at
the time of the transaction. But these are not the
only choice-of-law criteria, and certainly not the
best in contexts where the geographical locus of
events is so unclear. Domicile (and its cognates,
such as citizenship, principal place of business,
habitual residence, and so on) are also valid choice-
of-law criteria that have particular relevance to
problems, like those in cyberspace, that involve the
regulation of intangibles or of multinational transac-
tions.
The skeptics are further mistaken to the extent
that their arguments assume that all choice-of-law
problems must be resolved by multilateral choice-of-
law methodologies. A multilateral methodology asks
which of several possible laws governs a transaction,
and selects one of these laws on the basis of specified
criteria. Multilateral methods accentuate the situs
and complexity problems. But the regulatory issues
that are most relevant to the cyberspace governance
debate almost always involve unilateral choice-of-
law methods that alleviate these problems. A uni-
lateral method considers only whether the dispute at
issue has close enough connections to the forum to
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justify the application of local law. If so, local law
applies; if not, the case is dismissed and the potential
applicability of foreign law is not considered. For
example, a jurisdiction typically does not apply for-
eign criminal law. If a Tennessee court has personal
jurisdiction over someone from across the Virginia
border who shot and killed an in-stater, the court
does not consider whether Tennessee or Virginia
law applies. It considers only whether Tennessee law
applies. If so, the case proceeds; if not, it is dis-
missed.
Unilateral choice-of-law methods make the com-
plexity and situs problems less significant. They do
not require a determination of which of a number of
possible laws apply. Nor do they require a court to
identify where certain events occurred. What mat-
ters is simply whether the activity has local effects
that are significant enough to implicate local law. By
failing to recognize that courts can and will use uni-
lateral rather than multilateral choice-of-law meth-
ods to resolve cyberspace conflicts, the skeptics
again exaggerate the challenge of cyberspace regula-
tion.
G. Number and Velocity of Transactions
The skeptics' final descriptive claim is that even if
cyberspace transactions appear like real-space
transnational transactions in other respects, they dif-
fer significantly with respect to the velocity and
number of transactions. Cyberspace dramatically
lowers the costs of multinational communication.
With only a computer and Internet access, anyone
in the world can communicate with anyone, and
potentially everyone, in the world. The skeptics
believe communications via cyberspace will be so
prevalent that governments will not find it cost-
effective to regulate them.
A dramatic increase in the number and speed of
transactions might well multiply the aggregate harms
from such transactions. But this increases rather
than decreases a nation's incentives to regulate.
Consider Internet gambling. In pre-Internet days,
individuals in the United States could gamble from
home or work via telephone with domestic and off-
shore bookies. Although this form of gambling was
regulated by a variety of state and federal statutes,
the statutes were filled with loopholes and rarely
enforced because transactions were relatively infre-
quent. Internet gambling makes it significantly easi-
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er to gamble from home or work. This has led to a
dramatic increase in gambling and a related rise in
the costs of gambling that governments worry about:
fraud, diminution in local gambling and other enter-
tainment expenditures, loss of tax revenues,
decreased productivity, gambling by children, and so
on. Not surprisingly, federal and state governments
are beginning to regulate gambling much more
extensively, and seriously, than ever.
Even with governments' heightened incentives to
regulate Internet transactions, some believe that the
sheer number of transactions will overwhelm gov-
ernments' ability to regulate. A related argument is
that because individuals can so easily engage in
transnational communications via the Internet, gov-
ernmental regulation will be less effective; for indi-
viduals operating on the Internet are hard to identi-
fy, isolate, and thus sanction. Once again, the con-
clusion that regulation is infeasible simply does not
follow from these premises. The mistake here is the
belief that governments regulate only through direct
sanctioning of individuals. But of course this is not
the only way, or even the usual way, that regulation
works. Governments regulate an activity by raising
the activity's costs in a manner that achieves desired
ends. This can be accomplished through several
means other than individual sanctions.
Governments can, for example, try to alter the social
meaning of the activity, regulate the hardware and
software through which the activity takes place,
make individual penalties severe and notorious, or
impose liability on intermediaries like Internet ser-
vice providers or credit card companies.
In short, a dramatic increase in the number and
velocity of transactions by itself says very little about
the feasibility of governmental regulation. Numerous
communication advances, beginning with the tele-
graph, dramatically increased the velocity and num-
ber of communications, and lowered their costs. The
skeptics have provided no reason to think that the
differences between cyberspace and prior communi-
cation technology are so much greater than the dif-
ferences between pre- and post-telegraph technology
(which reduced communication time from weeks
and months to hours and minutes), or between pre-
and post-telephone technology (which also dramati-
cally reduced the cost and enhanced the frequency
and privacy of transjurisdictional communication)
to justify the conclusion that governmental regula-
tion will be nonefficacious.
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IV. IS CYBERSPACE REGULATION
LEGITIMATE?
Section III explored some of the many ways that
nations might regulate cyberspace transactions. This
Section considers the skeptics' normative claim that
such regulation is illegitimate. This claim is directed
primarily to the application of mandatory laws. The
skeptics argue that cyberspace should be self-regulat-
ed, and that national mandatory laws should not
limit these private legal orders. This argument sub-
sumes three closely related claims: (i) unilateral reg-
ulation of cyberspace is extraterritorial; (ii) unilater-
al regulation of cyberspace produces significant
spillover effects; and (iii) the structure of cyberspace
makes effective notice of territorial regulation
impossible. I address each claim in turn.
A. Extraterritoriality
In the Digitalbook.com example above, Singapore
and England regulated the local effects of
Digitalbook.com's activities in the United States. In
the CompuServe example, Germany regulated trans-
mission flows from other countries. These are the
types of extraterritorial regulation that worry the
skeptics. But such extraterritorial regulation is com-
monplace in the modern world. As we saw above, it
is settled with respect to real-space activity that a
nation's right to control events within its territory
and to protect its citizens permits it to regulate the
local effects of extraterritorial acts.
The same rationale applies to cyberspace because
cyberspace is for these purposes no different than
real space. Transactions in cyberspace involve real
people in one territorial jurisdiction either (i) trans-
acting with real people in other territorial jurisdic-
tions or (ii) engaging in activity in one jurisdiction
that causes real-world effects in another territorial
jurisdiction. To this extent, activity in cyberspace is
functionally identical to transnational activity medi-
ated by other means, such as mail or telephone or
smoke signal. The new medium of communication is
richer, more complex, and much more efficient. But
in terms of real-space acts in one jurisdiction that
produce real-space effects in another, it is no differ-
ent from other forms of transnational transaction
and communication. And the justification for and
legitimacy of regulating local effects is no different.
Under current conceptions of territorial sovereignty,
a jurisdiction is allowed to regulate extraterritorial
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acts that cause harmful local effects unless and until
it has consented to a higher law (for example, inter-
national law or constitutional law) that specifies
otherwise.
B. Spillover Effects
The skeptics argue that unilateral extraterritorial
regulation of cyberspace differs from similar regula-
tion of real-space activities because of the regula-
tion's spillover effects in other jurisdictions. These
effects are inevitable, they think, because informa-
tion flows in cyberspace appear simultaneously in all
territorial jurisdictions. As a result, unilateral territo-
rial regulation of the local effects of cyberspace
transmission flows will sometimes affect the flow and
regulation of web information in other countries.
This is especially true when the regulation is direct-
ed at a multijurisdictional access provider, as was the
case with Germany's regulation of CompuServe.
Section III described how technology and interna-
tional cooperation can diminish these spillover
effects. But even without these mitigating factors,
there is nothing extraordinary or illegitimate about
unilateral regulation of transnational activity that
affects activity and regulation in other countries.
Germany's regulation of CompuServe is no less
legitimate than the United States' regulation of the
competitiveness of the English reinsurance market,
which has worldwide effects on the availability and
price of reinsurance. Nor is it any different in this
regard from national regulation of transborder pollu-
tion, or from national consumer protection regula-
tion of transnational contracts, or from national
criminal prohibitions on transnational drug activi-
ties, all of which produce spillovers. In many con-
texts, there are powerful reasons for nations to sur-
render their regulatory prerogatives in order to
reduce spillover and other costs. But at least under
our current conceptions of territorial sovereignty,
such reforms must proceed by national consent. The
need for such consent begins from the premise that
in its absence, national regulation of local effects is a
legitimate incident of sovereignty, even if such regu-
lation produces spillover effects.
Germany's regulation of CompuServe is not just a
legitimate incident of territorial sovereignty. It is
also fair to CompuServe under a straightforward rec-
iprocal benefits rationale. CompuServe reaps finan-
cial and other benefits from its presence in
Germany. Without this presence, German enforce-
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ment threats would be largely empty. CompuServe
need not remain in Germany; it could close its shop
there. Its decision to stay in Germany and comply
with German regulations might increase the price of
its services in Germany and elsewhere. For
CompuServe this is a cost of doing business via a
new communication medium. The desire to reduce
this and related costs is driving the development of
technology that permits geographical and other
forms of discrimination on the Internet. But even in
the absence of such technologies, Germany's local
regulation of CompuServe remains within tradition-
al reciprocity-based justifications for regulating local
effects.
What about CompuServe users in other countries
who are affected by the German regulation? It is
hard to see how the German regulation unfairly bur-
dens them. They remain free to choose among
dozens of Internet access services that are not affect-
ed by the German regulation. Consider further the
German perspective. Germany bans certain forms of
pornography within its borders. If the medium of
this pornography were paper, there would be no fair-
ness-based jurisdictional objection to a German pro-
hibition on the pornography's entry at the border or
to German punishment of those who are later dis-
covered to have smuggled it in. From Germany's
perspective, it makes no difference whether the
pornography enters the nation via cyberspace or the
postal service. The rationale for the regulation is the
same in both cases: something is happening within
Germany that implicates the government's paternal-
istic concerns or that harms third parties within its
borders. The fact that the local regulation might
affect the cost or availability of pornography in other
countries is, from this perspective, irrelevant.
Fairness does not require Germany to yield local
control over its territory in order to accommodate
the users of a new communication technology in
other countries. Nor does it require Germany to
absorb the local costs of foreign activity because of
the costs that the German regulation might impose
on such activity.
This latter point sheds light on one of the major
fallacies of the skeptics' normative project. The
skeptics argue that the spillover effects caused by ter-
ritorial regulation of cyberspace justify cyberspace
self-regulation. Spillover-minimization is not the cri-
terion of legitimacy for national regulation of harm-
ful local effects. But even if it were, the skeptics'
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conclusions would not follow. For the skeptics com-
pletely ignore the spillover effects of cyberspace
activity itself. They do not consider these effects
because they take it as an article of faith that cyber-
space participants form a self-contained group that
can internalize the costs of its activity. But this
assumption is false. Cyberspace participants are no
more self-contained than telephone users, members
of the Catholic Church, corporations, and other pri-
vate groups with activities that transcend jurisdic-
tional borders. They are real people in real space
transacting in a fashion that produces real-world
effects on cyberspace participants and nonpartici-
pants alike. Cyberspace users solicit and deliver kid-
die porn, launder money, sexually harass, defraud,
and so on. It is these and many other real-space
costs-costs that cyberspace communities cannot
effectively internalize-that national regulatory
regimes worry about and aim to regulate.
So the spillover argument runs in both directions.
Cyberspace activity outside of Germany produces
spillovers in Germany, and German regulation pro-
duces spillovers on cyberspace activity beyond its
borders. The legitimacy and fairness of Germany's
territorial regulation does not depend on minimiza-
tion of these costs. But even if it did, the skeptics'
desired normative conclusion that cyberspace should
be self-regulated would only follow if the costs of
cyberspace self-regulation were less significant than
the costs of territorial regulation. The skeptics have
not begun to try to demonstrate that this is true.
And any such attempt is very unlikely to succeed at
the level of generality at which their arguments are
invariably pitched.
C. Notice
The skeptics' final normative argument against
mandatory law regulation of cyberspace concerns
notice. In real space, parties can direct the flow of
their transnational transactions and can in most
cases avoid jurisdictions that prohibit the transac-
tions. The skeptics claim that this cannot be done in
cyberspace. They worry that cyberspace participants
therefore lack notice about governing mandatory
law and hence cannot conform their behavior to it.
The skeptics claim this lack of notice violates basic
norms of fairness.
This argument rests on a number of empirical
assumptions that have been questioned in Section
III. The assumption that cyberspace involves uncon-
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trollable universal information flows is inaccurate
today and will become even less accurate with time.
Information flows can be directed and controlled in
a variety of ways, with varying costs that will almost
certainly decrease in the future. Concerns about
notice are further attenuated by the many limita-
tions on enforcement jurisdiction that effectively
limit the application of mandatory laws to entities
with a local presence. In none of the many cases in
which regulations have been enforced against cyber-
space transactions has an out-of-state defendant had
a basis to claim unfair surprise.
It is nonetheless worth considering how the
notice issue will play out in cyberspace. The
Constitution and international law impose weak
notice requirements on the application of local law
to extraterritorial conduct. The Constitution per-
mits a state with significant contacts to the case to
apply its law if the defendant could have reasonably
foreseen its application. International law might
impose a similar restraint on legislative jurisdiction.
This requirement of reasonable foreseeability does
not mean that harmful local effects of extraterritori-
al activity are automatically immune from local reg-
ulation just because they were accidental, or because
the agent of the activity did not know the precise
locus of the effects. "Reasonable foreseeability" is a
dynamic concept. A manufacturer that pollutes in
one state is not immune from the antipollution laws
of other states where the pollution causes harm just
because it cannot predict which way the wind blows.
Similarly, a cyberspace content provider cannot nec-
essarily claim ignorance about the geographical flow
of information as a defense to the application of the
law of the place where the information appears. At
first glance it appears unfair to expose
Digitalbook.com to the antipornography laws of
Singapore. But it would not seem unfair if
Digitalbook.com could at a small cost prevent its
information from entering Singapore. Nor would it
seem unfair to expose Digitalbook.com to liability
for the damage caused in Singapore by a virus that it
released into cyberspace that destroyed every Apple
computer hard drive connected to the Internet.
These intuitions show that, like the related per-
sonal jurisdiction question, the standard of foresee-
ability depends on a complex mixture of what the
content provider knows or reasonably should have
known about the geographical consequences of its
acts, the significance of the extrajursidictional harms
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caused by the acts, and the costs of precautions.
Content providers can already achieve pretty reli-
able information flow control by conditioning access
to content on telephone or facsimile proof of geo-
graphical location. To many this is an unacceptable
burden on Internet communication. But there is
nothing sacrosanct about Internet speed and ease,
and dimunitions in speed and ease might be warrant-
ed by the social costs imposed by uncontrolled infor-
mation flows. And in any event, as filtering and
identification technologies continue to raise the fea-
sibility and lower the costs of information flow con-
trol, the problem of notice in cyberspace will look
much like the problem of notice in real space.
CONCLUSION
Cyberspace transactions are no different from "real-
space" transnational transactions. They involve peo-
ple in real space in one jurisdiction communicating
with people in real space in other jurisdictions in a
way that often does good but sometimes causes
harm. There is no general normative argument that
supports the immunization of cyberspace activities
from territorial regulation. And there is every reason
to believe that nations can exercise territorial
authority to achieve significant regulatory control
over cyberspace transactions. Resolution of the
choice-of-law problems presented by cyberspace
transactions will be challenging, but no more chal-
lenging than similar problems raised in other
transnational contexts.
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